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Jessica A. Levinson∗ 
Election laws dictate the ways in which we structure our 
government. Decisions concerning issues such as who can vote, how 
legislative district lines are drawn, and how money is spent in our 
elections help to define the contours of our representative 
democracy. These choices delineate vital issues concerning who we 
consider to be part of our community for purposes of allowing 
people to exercise the fundamental right to vote, how we structure 
elections for those who represent us, and who and how people can 
attempt to affect the electoral process. 
In this issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, five 
articles address these vitally important topics. 
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
In this issue there are two articles discussing issues related to 
campaign finance law. Campaign finance laws are designed to 
regulate the transfer of power amassed in the economic marketplace 
to power in the political marketplace.1 These laws are premised on a 
belief that when large sums of money flow freely to candidates, 
political parties, and independent groups, negative consequences can 
result for both electoral and political processes.2 
∗ Clinical Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. The author wishes to thank the fantastic
editorial team of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, including Marleina Paz, Diana De Leon, 
and Karen Roche. The author also wishes to express great respect for the hard work of each of the 
student authors—Sarah Harding, Rudy Klapper, Erika Stern, Rosemarie Unite, and Jessica 
Medina—who wrote pieces for this issue. Professors Karl Manheim and Aaron Caplan provided 
invaluable guidance, editorial comments, and support for the articles contained in this issue. Each 
of the three professors involved with this issue was primarily responsible for overseeing one to 
two articles. 
1. See Jessica A. Levinson, The Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why Buckley v.
Valeo Is Wrong, 47 UNIV. OF RICH. L. REV. 881, 890 (2013); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The 
Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 895 (1998). 
2. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (noting the
“corrosive and distorting effects” of large campaign contributions “accumulated with the help of 
the corporate form”) overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010). 
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In the wake of the Watergate scandals, Congress passed our 
nation’s first piece of comprehensive campaign finance legislation, 
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).3 As amended, the 
FECA created limits on campaign contributions and expenditures, 
required that in some instances those giving and spending money in 
an effort to influence elections disclose those sums,4 and established 
a system of voluntary public financing for presidential candidates.5 
In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo6—the case that remains the bedrock 
of campaign finance jurisprudence—the Supreme Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of many provisions of the FECA.7 The Court held 
that money given and spent in campaigns is entitled to First 
Amendment protection.8 As a result, any campaign finance 
restriction must survive a high level of scrutiny under the First 
Amendment. In that case, the Court upheld limits on campaign 
contributions and disclosure provisions and struck down limits on 
campaign expenditures.9 
II. HOW CAN WE LIMIT MONEY SPENT IN ELECTIONS?
In Buckley, the Court ruled that when performing a First 
Amendment analysis, the only sufficiently important, or compelling, 
governmental interest is preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.10 This of course means that if a restriction is viewed as 
serving to prevent corruption or the appearance thereof it will be 
upheld if it is properly tailored, but if the restriction is not seen to 
serve those interests it will be struck down. Hence the determination 
of how narrowly or broadly the Court defines corruption, and 
whether or not it recognizes other interests as sufficiently important, 
often dictates whether or not campaign finance restrictions will be 
upheld. 
3. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, PUB. L. NO. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (2012)). 
4. 2 U.S.C. § 434.
5. See id. §§ 431–455.
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 19–23.
9. Id. at 23, 29.
10. Id. at 26–27, 33. The government has at times argued that additional interests should be
viewed as compelling. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240 (2006); Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. 
Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787–88 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–57. 
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After the Court’s decisions in 2010 in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission,11 and in 2014 in McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission,12 corruption now means only quid pro quo 
corruption.13 Quid pro quo means “something for something.”14 The 
Court has thus defined corruption in its narrowest form. 
In one article, author Jessica Medina traces the history of the 
Court’s ever-changing definition of corruption, and the cases in 
which the Court has treated other governmental interests as 
sufficiently important to uphold campaign finance restrictions.15 As 
Medina notes, the definition of corruption often contracts or expands 
depending on the person or entity spending the money.16 For 
instance, prior to its decision in Citizens United, the Court 
recognized that in the case of corporate expenditures, reducing 
corruption—broadly defined as distortion—could be an interest 
sufficient to uphold restrictions.17 
In her piece, Medina criticizes the current approach, arguing that 
corruption should be defined as broader than merely quid pro quo 
corruption.18 Medina contends that the legislative purposes behind 
campaign finance restrictions are not served by the Court’s adoption 
of a narrow definition of corruption.19 
Finally, Medina concludes by proposing a “sliding scale” in 
which the definition of corruption varies according to the person or 
entity making political expenditures.20 This approach, Medina 
argues, sufficiently protects the First Amendment speech rights of 
spenders while also serving the guard against the evils campaign 
finance laws were designed to thwart.21 
11. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
12. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
13. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909–11.
14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1367 (9th ed. 2009); see Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of
Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 130 (1997). 
15. Jessica Medina, When Rhetoric Obscures Reality: The Definition of Corruption and Its
Shortcomings, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 597 (2015). 
16. Id. at 602.
17. Id. at 609.
18. Id. at 623.
19. Id. at 626.
20. Id. at 637.
21. Id. at 645.
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III. WHEN CAN WE REQUIRE DISCLOSURE BY THOSE GIVING AND
SPENDING MONEY IN ELECTIONS?
Campaign finance restrictions do more than limit the amount of
money that can be given and spent in campaigns. These laws also 
require, under certain circumstances, the disclosure of the identity of 
those giving and spending money.22 In Buckley, the Supreme Court 
upheld the disclosure provisions contained in the FECA.23 First, as it 
did when it upheld contribution limits, the Court found that 
disclosure provisions could prevent corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, because disclosure of campaign contributors and 
spenders will provide the public the information necessary to 
determine whether there is an improper connection between 
contributors or spenders and candidates.24 Second, the Court 
concluded that disclosure gives the public fundamental information 
about candidates and their place on the political spectrum, and the 
sources behind political advertising.25 
Robust disclosure must, of course, be balanced against the right 
to privacy. It cannot and should not be that campaign contributors 
and spenders forfeit privacy interests the moment they decide to 
enter the political forum. Such a situation could chill both speech and 
associational rights as contributors and spenders are deterred from 
giving money to and spending money to support or oppose 
candidates or measures. Hence, courts must strike a delicate balance 
between the interests supporting disclosure and transparency and 
those supporting the right to privacy. 
As the Court continues to strike down limitations on the amount 
of money that can be spent in elections, legislators (and the voters 
via the initiative process) are increasingly turning to disclosure as the 
best vehicle through which to reduce corruption and its appearance, 
and to provide the public with vital information about those spending 
money in attempt to influences voters.26 
In her article, Sarah Harding tackles how best to strike the 
balance between the government’s interests in disclosure laws and 
22. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2012).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976).
24. Id. at 76.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 103, 116 Stat. 81,
87–88 (2002) (amending 2 U.S.C. § 434 to include more disclosure requirements). 
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the potential harms that disclosure laws can pose.27 Harding traces 
the history of disclosure laws and the Court’s treatment of many of 
those laws.28 Harding also criticizes the Court’s current analytical 
framework as devoid of useful guidelines and lacking necessary 
clarity.29 Harding concludes by proposing factors that legislators and 
members of the judiciary should consider when determining the 
constitutionality of campaign disclosure provisions.30 
IV. VOTING
The right to vote is arguably the fundamental right to end all 
fundamental rights.31 The right to vote is preservative; it protects 
one’s ability to exercise other rights.32 
People have not only the right to vote, but also with some 
limitations, the right to an “effective” vote.33 Thus legislatures can 
affect the right to vote with various mechanisms, such as by laws 
limiting who can vote. One of the articles in this issue addresses the 
question of who can vote in our representative democracy. 
Legislatures can also make laws affecting the right to an effective 
vote when they enact redistricting plans. Another article in this issue 
explores this topic. 
When exercising their right to vote, members of the electorate 
may weigh in not only on representatives, but also on pieces of 
legislation. In many states and localities throughout the nation, voters 
can completely bypass the legislative process and directly enact 
legislation via the mechanisms of direct democracy. Another article 
in this issue explores one of these mechanisms, the initiative process. 
V. WHO CAN VOTE?
Rules restricting the ability of certain individuals to vote define 
who we, as a society, want to be part of our community. By 
27. Sarah Harding, Balancing Disclosure and Privacy Interests in Campaign Finance, 48
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 651 (2015). 
28. Id. at 656.
29. Id. at 679.
30. Id. at 691.
31. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that 
right strike at the heart of representative government.”). 
32. See id.
33. Id. at 555 n.29 (“‘The right to vote includes the right to have the ballot counted.’”
(quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting))). 
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prohibiting some individuals from voting, we are telling those people 
that we do not want them to weigh in on decisions affecting our 
representative democracy. The propriety of these regulations has 
been hotly debated for decades. 
Currently, many laws targeting who can vote in our elections 
focus on felons. There are millions of individuals who are prohibited 
from exercising their right to vote because of past convictions for 
felony offenses.34 State laws differ greatly as to when, whether, and 
how felons can regain their voting rights. All but two states35 prohibit 
felons from voting for some period of time following their 
convictions. 
In her article, Erika Stern discusses the issue of felon 
disenfranchisement.36 Stern traces the history of laws limiting the 
ability of felons to vote by comparing those laws to past restrictions 
on the right vote, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and laws 
prohibiting women from voting.37 Stern then argues the act of voting 
is entitled to First Amendment protection.38 Stern next avers that the 
reason states place limitations on the ability of felons to vote is that 
legislators (and perhaps the citizens they represent) simply do not 
trust felons.39 Stern concludes by arguing that under the First 
Amendment there can be no constitutional justification for 
prohibiting felons from voting, particularly given that the 
legislature’s stated rationale for such restrictions is a mistrust of the 
judgment of felons.40 
VI. HOW CAN WE BURDEN THE RIGHT TO VOTE?
In addition to limiting who can vote, other laws may affect one’s 
right to an effective vote. Via the redistricting process, legislators, or 
in some instances, commissioners, draw legislative lines on the local, 
34. See Angela Behrens, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 239 (2004). 
35. Id. (citing Maine and Vermont as the only two states that allow voting while
incarcerated). 
36. Erika Stern, “The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself”: The Constitutional
Infirmities with Felon Disenfranchisement and Citing Fear as the Rationale for Depriving Felons 
of Their Right to Vote, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 703 (2015). 
37. Id. at 709.
38. Id. at 718.
39. Id. at 739.
40. Id. at 752.
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state, and federal levels.41 This process has been described as 
“musical chairs with switchblades” because how lines are drawn 
plays a large role in determining who is in power.42 Political 
jockeying is an ever-present facet of the redistricting process.43 
After decades of discrimination against racial minorities, in 
1965 Congress passed an historic piece of civil rights legislation, the 
Voting Rights Act (VRA).44 There are two main sections of the Act 
that protect the right to vote.45 The first is section 2, which prohibits 
voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, 
color,46 or membership in one of the language minority groups.47  
The second is section 5, which requires that voting changes in 
certain “covered” jurisdictions receive “preclearance” by the United 
States attorney general, or by a United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia prior to going into effect.48 Covered 
jurisdictions are those that have a history of discrimination against 
racial and language minorities. In 2013, in Shelby County v. 
Holder,49 the Supreme Court invalidated section 4 of the VRA, 
which contains the formula to determine which jurisdictions would 
be “covered” and subject to preclearance.  
Many challenges waged under both section 2 and the 
now-defunct section 5 of the VRA center on redistricting plans.50 
41. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 410 (2006); Seema
Mehta, Redrawing of District Boundaries Will Shake Up California Politics, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/10/local/la-me-maps-20110610; Redistricting, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (redistricting is the “[r]ealignment of a legislative 
district’s boundaries to reflect changes in population and ensure proportionate representation by 
elected officials”). 
42. Jessica A. Levinson, “California Redistricting—‘Musical Chairs With Switchblades’”,
POLAWTICS (June 11, 2011), http://polawtics.lls.edu/2011/06/california-redistricting-musical 
-chairs.html.
43. See, e.g., Perry, 548 U.S. at 410 (“Faced with a Republican opposition that could be
moving toward majority status, the [Texas] state legislature drew a congressional redistricting 
plan designed to favor Democratic candidates.”). 
44. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
45. Paul L. McKaskle, The Voting Rights Act and the “Conscientious Redistricter”, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1995). 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2).
48. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 323 (2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c).
49. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
50. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the
Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 129–130 (2010) 
(discussing “equality litigation” in the context of “minority vote dilution”). 
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Redistricting plans, for instance, are often challenged for diluting 
minority voting power.51 Now that section 5 stands dormant,52 
section 2 may be vulnerable to challenge.53  
In her article, Rosemarie Unite examines a certain confluence of 
circumstances that may put section 2 at risk of being gutted or 
invalidated by the Supreme Court.54  Unite begins by exploring why 
the dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court with respect 
to section 2 may no longer be possible due to congressional 
polarization and gridlock.55 The irony is that congressional 
polarization is caused, in part, by partisan gerrymandering, against 
which section 2 may be one of the only means of protection.56  
Unite then discusses how a challenge to the statute might fare at 
the hands of an equally polarized Supreme Court,57 led by a chief 
justice who fought the enactment of Section 2’s current form during 
his early days as an attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice58  
Strong arguments exist both for and against the constitutionality of 
section 2, so the justices’ individual views may indeed influence the 
outcome.59  
Finally, Unite assesses the ramifications of a weakened or 
invalidated section 2 at a time when the minority vote begins to 
amass the potential to swing presidential elections and, by extension, 
the futures of the political parties.60 
51. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
52. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2648 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The
Court stops any application of § 5 by holding that § 4(b)’s coverage formula is 
unconstitutional.”). 
53. Ellen Katz, Professor, Univ. of Mich., Remarks at the Voting Rights Act and
Redistricting Panel at the George Washington University Law School: Law and Democracy: A 
Symposium on Political Law (Nov. 16, 2012) at 1:09:32, available at http://vimeo.com 
/user9108723/review/55780860/5749aec1a9 (arguing that section 2 is “undeniably vulnerable” 
for the same reasoning she surmises the Court will invalidate section 5). 
54. Rosemarie Unite, The Perrymander, Polarization, and Peyote v. Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1075 (2013). 
55. Id. at 1107.
56. Id. at 1101, 1109.
57. Id. at 1128–39.
58. Id. at 1114.
59. Id. at 1114–28.
60. Id. at 1140.
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VII. WHAT ARE WE VOTING FOR?
Direct democracy allows citizens to bypass state legislatures and 
directly enact and repeal legislation.61 The most common mechanism 
of direct democracy is the initiative process, through which citizens 
can draft, circulate, and enact statutes and constitutional 
amendments. 
Many states and localities enacted the initiative process to 
reduce the influence of special interests on elected officials and 
promote grassroots political activity and power.62 The ballot 
initiative process essentially creates citizen legislators.63 The 
initiative process has been described as the fourth branch of 
government.64 In many states, laws enacted via the initiative process 
have drastically changed the structure of those state governments.65 
The sad irony of the initiative process is that the very interests it was 
designed to guard against—moneyed interests—now control the 
process.66 
California adopted the processes of direct democracy in what 
was arguably the height of the Progressive Era in 1911.67 In his 
article, Rudy Klapper explores and critiques California’s ballot 
initiative process. Klapper argues that decisions by the California 
Supreme Court have upset the balance between our systems of direct 
61. Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1845, 1846 (1999). 
62. Jessica A. Levinson & Robert Stern, Ballot Box Budgeting in California: The Bane of
the Golden State or an Overstated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 694 (2010). 
63. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy, 4 U. OF CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLES, 17, 17–19 (1996–1997). 
64. CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992), available at 
http://policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/215.pdf. 
65. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Top Judge Calls Calif. Government ‘Dysfunctional’, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A23 (noting how California’s referendum process allows voters to 
decide everything “from how parts of the state budget are spent to how farm animals are 
managed”). 
66. See Garrett, supra note 63 (arguing that special interests, rather than citizen-legislators,
frame the initiative referendum process); see also Levinson & Stern, supra note 62, at 710 
(arguing that some believe the initiative process has now been hijacked by the very special 
interests it was meant to guard against); see also Jessica A. Levinson, Op-Ed., Four Ways to 
Reform the Initiative Process on Its 100th Anniversary, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 20, 2011, available at 
http://llsblog.lls.edu/faculty/2011/10/four-ways-to-reform-the-initiative-process-on-its-100th 
-anniversary.html.
67. Karl M. Manheim, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1185–88 (1998) (describing the political situation and pseudo-“Banana
Republic” atmosphere that existed in California and directly led to the adoption of the initiative).
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democracy and representative democracy.68 Klapper focuses much of 
his discussion on the state supreme court’s treatment of the three 
constitutionality limitations on the initiative power—the ability of 
the people to pass constitutional amendments, but not constitutional 
revisions via the initiative process; the requirement that initiatives 
address only one subject; and the limited ability of the legislature to 
amend statutory initiatives.69 
Klapper discusses a number of the negative consequences that 
result from California’s current system of direct democracy.70 
Klapper asserts, among other things, that as it stands, the initiative 
process allows a simple majority of Californians to pass laws that 
undermine core values of both republican government and the 
California constitution itself.71 Klapper also contends that the 
initiative process has lead to extreme political gridlock.72 
Klapper concludes by arguing that the California Supreme Court 
should change its approach and more strictly enforce the three 
constitutional limitations placed on the initiative process.73 In 
addition, Klapper proposes that the California legislature reform the 
initiative process to make it a more deliberative process, rather than 
one that threatens to impose the “tyranny of the majority” over 
Californians.74 
This issue contributes to the discourse by examining how laws 
governing our electoral processes help to shape our representative 
democracy and proposes noteworthy and significant changes that 
would deeply affect the underlying structure of our government. 
68. Rudy Klapper, The Falcon Cannot Hear The Falconer: How California’s Initiative
Process Is Creating an Untenable Constitution, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 755 (2015). 
69. Id. at 761.
70. Id. at 784.
71. Id. at 803.
72. Id. at 755.
73. Id. at 761.
74. Id. at 804.
